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Abstract In this article we present a class of formulas ϕn, n ∈ Nat,
that need at least 2n assumptions to be proved in a normal proof in
Natural Deduction for purely implicational minimal propositional logic.
In purely implicational classical propositional logic, with Peirce’s rule,
each ϕn is proved with only one assumption in Natural Deduction in a
normal proof. Hence, the formulas ϕn have exponentially sized proofs in
cut-free Sequent Calculus and Tableaux. In fact 2n is the lower-bound for
normal proofs in ND, cut-free Sequent proofs and Tableaux. We discuss
the consequences of the existence of this class of formulas for designing
automatic proof-procedures based on these deductive systems.
1 Introduction
Providing proofs for propositional tautologies seems to be a hard task.
Huge proofs are such that their size is super-polynomial with regard to
the size of their conclusions. Knowing that there is a classical proposi-
tional logic tautology having only huge proofs is related to know whether
NP = CoNP or not (see [2]). Intuitionistic logic is PSPACE-complete
([11]) and Richard Statman (see [16]) showed that purely implicational
minimal logic (M→) is PSPACE-complete too. We showed in [8] that,
if a propositional logic has a Natural Deduction (ND) with the sub-
formula property then it is PSPACE-Hard. This follows from the fact
that M→polynomially encodes any propositional logic that has such ND
system. Thus, the existence of huge proofs for a more general class of
propositional logics is related to the existence of huge proofs in M→that
amounts to know whether PSPACE = NP or not. The relations between
these computational complexity classes and the existence of huge proofs
involve arbitrary proof systems, indeed. For example, NP = PSPACE
is the case, if and only if, for any M→tautology there is a proof system
that produces a polynomially sized proof of this tautology.
Dealing with arbitrary and general proof systems is quite hard, and
is out of scope of this article. However, studying particular proof systems
for key logics, like M→or classical logic, can shed some light on practical
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aspects of implementing propositional theorem provers from the efficiency
and economy of storage point of view.
M→carries almost all the proof-theoretical and logical information
to produce polynomially bounded proofs in well-behaved1 propositional
logics. Thus we can conclude that focusing investigations onM→is worth
of noticing.
There are many proof systems for M→. The most well-known are
structural/analytic proof systems. Well-known systems are the Sequent
Calculus ([4], Natural Deduction ([4] and [13]) and Tableaux ([1,15])
based. These systems, mainly the first and the third kind, are quite good
in providing means to produce proofs automatically. The backward chain-
ing procedure, for example, if applied to a Sequent Calculus based proof
system provides an automatic way to produce proofs. The problem with
these proof procedures is when a decision on which rule to apply has to
be made and how to deal with non-provable formulas when it is the case.
With respect to this feature of dealing with invalid formulas, the litera-
ture on both systems, Sequent Calculus and Tableaux, provides methods
that either produce a proof or a counter-model.
In M→, to provide a counter-model is so hard as to provide a proof,
since it is a PSPACE-complete problem and the complexity class is deter-
ministic. We know thatM→has finite model property and that the size of
the counter-model is super-polynomially upper bounded with respect to
the formula. It is interesting to investigate how this is related to the size
of proofs in M→, or at least to have a concrete evidence that huge proofs
may be the case. Our intention is not only show huge proofs in M→. To
do that, we can use the polynomial translations reported in [16] or [8] to
generate a formula from the Pigeon-Hole principle into M→. We know,
from [9], that this formula has only super-polynomially sized proofs in
Resolution, and hence in cut-free Sequent Calculus and the same hap-
pens to the translation to M→in cut-free Sequent Calculus and Natural
Deduction. It is quite hard to detect from this approach to obtain huge
proofs in M→any precise reason for the super-size of the resulting proof.
We believe that directly focusing on M→is a more promising path, since
M→has less combinatorial alternatives, less logical constants, less alter-
native deductive system. The genesis of huge proofs in M→is interesting
and may shed some new light in propositional logic complexity.
This article, motivated by the relationship between counter-model and
proof construction in an integrated process, improves a bit the knowledge
on this subject by showing a class of formulas inM→that have proofs with
1 With sub-formula property
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at least exponentially-many assumptions, and hence are super-polynomially
sized. The relation of these formulas with counter-model generation is dis-
cussed in section 5. In fact what is reported here was generated by the
need of providing counter-models in a naive proof-procedure forM→based
in Sequent Calculus as it is briefly discussed in section 5. In section 3 we
introduce the class of formulas and in section 4 we show that they have ex-
ponentially sized normal proofs in the usual Natural Deduction for M→.
In the same section we also show that this is a lower bound in M→. In
classical propositional logic, these formulas have linear-sized proofs as it
is shown in section 3.
All the formal propositional proofs/derivations in this article are pre-
sented in Prawitz-style Natural Deduction. The size of these normal
proofs/derivations is polynomially simulated by cut-free Sequent Calcu-
lus and/or Tableaux. Thus, the lower bound shown here also applies to
them.
2 The purely implicational minimal logic
The (purely) implicational minimal logic M→is the fragment of mini-
mal logic containing only the logical constant →. Its semantics is the
intuitionistic Kripke semantics restricted to → only. Given propositional
language L, aM→model is a structure 〈U,,V〉, where U is a non-empty
set (worlds),  is a partial order relation on U and V is a function from U
into the power set of L, such that if i, j ∈ U and i  j then V(i) ⊆ V(j).
Given a model, the satisfaction relationship |= between worlds, in the
model, and formulas is defined as:
– 〈U,,V〉 |=i p, p ∈ L, iff, p ∈ V(i)
– 〈U,,V〉 |=i α1 → α2, iff, for every j ∈ U , such that i  j, if
〈U,,V〉 |=j α1 then 〈U,,V〉 |=j α2.
Obs: In (full) minimal logic, ⊥ has no special meaning, so there is no
item declaring that 〈U,,V〉 6|=i ⊥. We remind that M→does not have
the ⊥ in its language.
As usual a formula α is valid in a model M, namely M |= α, if and
only if, it is satisfiable in every world i of the model, namely ∀i ∈ UM |=i
α. A formula is a M→tautology, if and only if, it is valid in every model.
A formula is satisfiable in M→if it is valid in a model M of M→. The
problem of knowing whether a formula is satisfiable or not is trivial in
M→. Every formula is satisfiable in the model 〈{⋆},,V〉, where ⋆ is the
only world, and p ∈ V(⋆), for every p. Thus, SAT is not an interesting
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problem in M→. The same cannot be told about knowing whether a
formula is a M→tautology or not.
It is known that Prawitz Natural Deduction system for minimal logic
with only the→-rules (→-Elim and→-Intro below) is sound and complete
for the M→Krikpe semantics. As a consequence of this, Gentzen’s LJ
system (see [17]) containing only right and left →-rules is also sound and
complete. As it is well-known one of these rules is not double-sounded
and not invertible. A naive proof-procedure for M→based only on this
usual Gentzen sequent calculus is not possible.
[α]
|
β
→-Intro
α→ β
α α→ β
→-Elim
β
In section 5 we discuss the consequences of the existence of the class of
formulas presented in this article to obtain a naive, complete and sound
proof-procedure for M→.
3 Needing exponentially many assumptions
In [3] we can find a discussion on the fact that when proving theorems in
a logic weaker than classical logic, the need of using an assumption more
than once has a strong influence on how complex is the proof procedure
and consequently the decision procedure for this logic. There, we can
find the formula ((((A → B) → A) → A) → B) → B. Considering
the proof systems of ND and CS mentioned in the previous section, this
formula needs to use the assumption ((A → B) → A) → A) → B at
least twice in order to be proved in M→. Inspired by this example, we
can define a class of formulas with no bounds on the use of assumptions.
This shows that limiting the use of assumptions in an automatic proof-
procedure for M→is not an alternative that ensures completeness. In the
sequel we define the class of formulas. Below you find a normal proof of
((((A → B)→ A)→ A)→ B)→ B. Note that it cannot be proved with
less than 2 assumptions of (((A→ B)→ A)→ A)→ B.
The following formula combines two instances of the formula men-
tioned above in order to have a formula that needs 4 times an assumption.
((((A→ ξ)→ A)→ A)→ ξ)→ C (1)
, where ξ = (((D → C)→ D)→ D)→ C.
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In figure 1 we show a normal derivation of this formula 1 above. We
can see that it has 4 assumptions of ((A→ ξ)→ A)→ A)→ ξ). We can
see how to use this pattern such that if it is repeated n-times we define a
formula ϕn, such that, any normal proof of ϕn has to use an assumption
at least 2n times, see section 4. Before we proceed with ϕn definition, we
have to show that the need for repeating assumptions is not the case for
classical propositional logic.
Consider now that the logic is the purely implicational classical logic
instead of the purely implicational minimal logic. That is, we consider the
→ introduction and elimination rules, plus the classical absurdity rule,
or the Peirce’s rule: from C → D ⊢ C then infer C. Taking into account
the version with Peirce’s rule, we provide the proof of the formula 1 with
only use of assumption, as shown in figure 2. This comes from the fact
that (((D → C) → D) → D) in an instance of the implicational form of
Peirce’s rule, so it is provable. From this proof and ξ = (((D → C) →
D) → D) → C we prove C. ξ itself is provable by means of a proof of
the Peirce’s formula ((A → ξ) → A) → A) and the (((A → ξ) → A) →
A)→ ξ discharged to proof the desired formula. The purely implicational
classical logic is not the focus of this article, in [12] and [7] we can find
a detailed presentation of the purely implicational classical logic with
some proof-theoretic results. Our discussion on the classical setting has
the purpose of showing how the use of classical logic can, in some cases,
turns proofs smaller.
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[D]3
(((D → C) → D) → D)
[A]1
((A → ξ) → A) → A [(((A → ξ) → A) → A) → ξ]5
ξ
1
A → ξ [(A → ξ) → A]2
A
2
((A → ξ) → A) → A [(((A → ξ) → A) → A) → ξ]5
ξ
C
3
D → C [(D → C) → D]4
D
4
((D → C) → D) → D
[(((A → ξ) → A) → A) → ξ]5
Σ
ξ
C
5
((((A → ξ) → A) → A) → ξ) → C
(((A → ξ) → A) → A) → ξ
Σ
ξ is
[A]
[((A → ξ) → A) → A]1 [(((A → ξ) → A) → A) → ξ]5
ξ
1
A → ξ [(A → ξ) → A]2
A
2
((A → ξ) → A) → A [(((A → ξ) → A) → A) → ξ]5
ξ
Figure 1. Proof of the formula in purely implicational minimal logic
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ΠPeirce2
((D → C) → D) → D
ΠPeirce1
((A → ξ) → A) → A [(((A → ξ) → A) → A) → ξ]1
ξ
C
1
((((A → ξ) → A) → A) → ξ) → C
Figure 2. Proof of the formula in purely implicational classical logic
4 No bounds for occurrence assumptions in M→
In this section we prove that for each n there is a formula ϕn, such that,
any normal proof of ϕn has at least 2
n occurrence assumptions of the same
formula, that are all of them discharged in only one introduction rule. The
following proposition 1 shows that 2n is an upper bound by showing the
normal proof that uses 2n assumptions for proving ϕn. Theorem 1 shows
that there is no normal proof for any of the ϕn, in M→, with less than
2n assumptions discharged. In the sequel we define ϕn. As it was already
said in section 3, ϕn raises from an iteration process derived from the
previous examples.
Definition 1. Let χ[X,Y ] = (((X → Y ) → X) → X) → Y . Using
χ[X,Y ] we define recursively a family of formulas. Consider the propo-
sitional letters Di, Ci, i > 0. Let ξi, i > 0, be the formula recursively
defined as:
ξ1 = χ[D1, C] (2)
ξi+1 = χ[Di+1, ξi] (3)
Using this family of formulas we define the formula ϕn, n > 0, such that,
for any i ≥ 0:
ϕi+1 = ξi+1 → C
We can observe that ϕ1 = ξ1 → C can be proved by using proof Σ,
replacing ξ for C and A for D1, and applying an →-introduction as the
last rule. The obtained proof has 2 occurrence assumptions of the formula
ξ1. The proof of ϕ2 is the proof shown in figure 1, replacing ξ by ξ1, A
by D2 and D by D1, resulting in the proof showed in figure 3. Note that
the discharged formula (((D2 → ξ1) → D2) → D2) → ξ1 is broke in two
lines for reasons of space economy. The following lemma will be used in
the proof of proposition 1.
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Lemma 1. In the formula ξi, i > 0, if we proceed in a simultaneous
substitution, replacing C by ξ1, and for each k > 0, replacing Dk by
Dk+1, the resulting formula is χ[Di+1, ξi].
Proof. This lemma is proved by induction on i. For ξ1 we observe that
replacing C by ξ1 and D1 by D2 in ξ1, the resulting formula is χ[D2, ξ1].
Assuming that for i > 0, replacing of C by ξ1 and, for each k = 1, i, simul-
taneously replacing Di by Di+1 in ξi, yields χ[Di+1, ξi]. Observing that
ξi+1 = χ[Di+1, ξi] and by inductive hypothesis, simultaneous replacing of
C by ξ1 and Dk by Dk+1 in ξi, k = 1, i, yields ξi+1. As Di+1 does not
occur in ξi, finally replacing Di+1 by Di+2 in ξi+1 = χ[Di+1, ξi+1] yields
χ[Di+2, ξi+1]. This proves the inductive step.
Another observation is that substitutions as the above shown in the
lemma, if applied in a derivation Π in M→, do imply that the resulting
tree is a valid derivation too. This fact is justified by observing that
the replacements are always on atomic formulas and the rules of M→do
not have provisos to be unsatisfied as consequence of these replacements.
Thus,we have the following fact.
Fact 1 If Π is a derivation of α from γ1, . . . , γl and a substitution S (of
atomic formulas only) is applied to Π then S(Π) is a derivation of S(α)
from S(γ1), . . . ,S(γl). Besides that, if Π is normal then S(Π) is normal
too.
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[D1]
3
(((D1 → C) → D1) → D1)
[D2]
1
((D2 → ξ1) → D2) → D2
[(((D2 → ξ1) → D2)
→ D2) → ξ1]
5
ξ1
1
D2 → ξ1 [(D2 → ξ1) → D2]
2
D2
2
((D2 → ξ1) → D2) → D2
[(((D2 → ξ1) → D2)
→ D2) → ξ1]
5
ξ1
C
3
D1 → C [(D1 → C) → D1]
4
D1
4
((D1 → C) → D1) → D1
[(((D2 → ξ1) → D2)
→ D2) → ξ1]
5
Σ
ξ1
C
5
((((D2 → ξ1) → D2) → D2) → ξ1) → C
(((D2 → ξ1) → D2) → D2) → ξ1
Σ
ξ1 is
[D2]
[((D2 → ξ1) → D2) → D2]
1 [(((D2 → ξ1) → D2) → D2) → ξ1]
5
ξ1
1
D2 → ξ1 [(D2 → ξ1) → D2]
2
D2
2
((D2 → ξ1) → D2) → D2
[(((D2 → ξ1) → D2)
→ D2) → ξ1]
5
ξ1
Figure 3. Proof of ϕ2 in M→
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As ϕ1 has two (2
1) occurrences of the same assumption and ϕ2 has
four (22) occurrences of the same assumptions, we have the following
result.
Proposition 1. For any n > 0, there is a normal proof of ϕn having 2
n
occurrences of the same assumptions, that are discharged by the last rule
of the proof.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction. The basis n = 1 is the proof
shown inside figure 3. Assuming that ϕi, i > 0 has a normal proof Πϕi
having 2i occurrences of ξi discharged by its last inference rule. Thus, we
have a normal derivation Π of C from 2i occurrences of ξi, remembering
that ϕi = ξi → C. We argue that if we simultaneously replace C by ξ1,
and for each k = 1, i, replace Dk by Dk+1, we will have, by lemma 1
and fact 1, a normal derivation of ξ1 from 2
i occurrences of χ[Di+1, ξi].
Let us call this derivation Π⋆. The following derivation (see figure 4) is a
derivation of C from ((((Di+1 → ξi) → Di+1) → Di+1) → ξi) → C, i.e.,
it is a derivation of C from ξi+1, and hence, by an →-introduction of we
have a normal derivation of ϕi+1 discharging 2
i + 2i = 2i+1 assumptions
of the formula ξi+1
[D1]
3
(((D1 → C) → D1) → D1)
[(((Di+1 → ξi) → Di+1) → Di+1) → ξi]
5
Π⋆
ξ1
C
3
D1 → C [(D1 → C) → D1]
4
D1
4
((D1 → C) → D1) → D1
[(((Di+1 → ξi) → Di+1) → Di+1) → ξi]
5
Π⋆
ξ1
C
5
((((Di+1 → ξi) → Di+1) → Di+1) → ξi) → C
Figure 4. Proof of ϕi+1 in M→with 2
i+1 discharged assumptions of ξi+1
Q.E.D.
The following proposition provides 2i as the lower bound for number
of assumption occurrences of a sole formula in proving ϕi by means of
normal proofs in M→.
Theorem 1. Any normal proof of ϕi in M→has at least 2
i assumption
occurrences of ξi.
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Proof. We prove that for any i, there is no normal proof of ϕi with
less than 2i assumption occurrences of ξi. We first observe that ϕ1, i.e.,
((((D1 → C) → D1) → D1) → C) → C is not provable with only one
occurrence of ξ1 = (((D1 → C)→ D1)→ D1)→ C). If this was the case
we would have that ((D1 → C) → D1) → D1 is provable in M→, and
this cannot be since this formula is only classically valid. A Kripke model
with two worlds such that in the first world neither C nor D1 holds and
in second D1 holds but not C falsifies (((D1 → C)→ D1)→ D1)→ C.
Consider that there are normal proofs of ϕi with less than 2
i assump-
tion occurrences of ξi. So there is the least k (k > 0), such that, ϕk has
a normal proof with less than 2k assumption occurrences of ξk. Let Σk
be such proof. Since ϕk = ξk → C, this proof is as follows. We remember
that ξk is the only open assumption in Σk.
[ξk]
l
Σk
C
l
ξk → C
Since ξk = χ[Dk, ξk−1] = (((Dk → ξk−1)→ Dk)→ Dk)→ ξk−1, it has to
be major premise of an→-elim rule. If this is not the case then ξk is minor
premise of a→-elim rule having a major premise of the form ξk → β. This
formula on its turn has to be sub-formula of the open assumption of this
branch, for the derivation is normal and ξk → β can be only conclusion
of an application of an →-elim rule. Since the only open assumption in
Σk is ξk itself, the case of ξk as minor premise is not possible. Thus, as
ξk is major premise, Σk is of the following form, remembering how is ξk,
showed in the first line of this paragraph.
Σ′
(((Dk → ξk−1)→ Dk)→ Dk) [(((Dk → ξk−1)→ Dk)→ Dk)→ ξk−1]
l
ξk−1
Σk
C
l
ξk → C
Note that Σ′ is a sub-derivation of Σk and it may have ξk as open as-
sumption too, but this is not necessary. If we remove every sub-derivation
like Σ′ from Σk we end up with a proof as following:
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[ξk−1]
l
Σk−1
C
l
ξk−1 → C
The proof above is a proof of ϕk−1 with less than 2
k−1 assumption occur-
rences of ξk−1 discharged by the last rule. This contradicts the fact that
k is the least number holding this property.
Q.E.D.
5 Counter-model construction in Sequent Calculus for
M→
In this section we show how it is easy, from the computational aspect,
to produce M→counter-models from the following (incomplete) sequent
calculus for M→.
Axiom
Ξ, p⇒ p, [∆]
Ξ, γ1 ⇒ γ2, [∆]
→-right
Ξ ⇒ γ1 → γ2, [∆]
Ξ ⇒ α, [γ,∆] Ξ, β ⇒ γ
→-left
Ξ,α→ β ⇒ γ, [∆]
The formulas in the right-hand side of the sequent and between the
brackets are used only for counter-model construction. The main idea is
that a sequent of the form Ξ, p ⇒ q, [∆] having all members of Ξ ∪ ∆
as propositional letters and {Ξ, p} ∩ {q,∆} = ∅ is falsified in a Kripke
model with only one world. From this case and using the reversible (if any
premise is not valid the conclusion is too) rules of the system it is possible
to build a polynomially sized Kripke model for the conclusion of the tree.
Remember that in this case we do not have a proof. As already said,
this system is incomplete, for it is unable to prove any of the formulas
belonging to the class we presented here. The mentioned formulas are
only provable if the→-left rule used is the following, instead of the above
shown.
Ξ,α→ β ⇒ α, [γ,∆] Ξ,α→ β, β ⇒ γ
→-left
Ξ,α→ β ⇒ γ, [∆]
12 2014
6. CONCLUSION
In this case a counter-model generation is not so obvious, in fact we
did not obtained one. If there were a bound on the use of repeated formu-
las, we could have used both versions of the →-rule for a counter-model
generation. Of course, for every formula there is a bound, for example the
formula ((((A → B) → A) → A) → B) → B the bound is 2. What we
have shown is that there is no fixed bound for every formula. In fact, if
such a fixed bound existed we would have that every M→formula would
have a polynomially sized search-space to find either proofs or counter-
models.
6 Conclusion
Our contribution is in the context thatM→is the hardest and most repre-
sentative propositional logic to define efficient proof-procedures. We show
an example alerting for the fact that allowing unlimited use of assump-
tions is worth for any complete proof-procedure. This example runs in
M→. We are not aware of a similar example for classical logic. In this
case classical propositional logic would be more efficient than M→if such
example does not existed. Propositional logic complexity has a lot of con-
jectures, starting with the relations between the main complexity classes.
This article has the sole purpose of providing an example where the ex-
ponential grow of proofs has nothing to do with disjunction and combi-
natorial principles like the Pigeon-Hole2. We provided such example.
Developers of theorem provers have to be aware of many aspects of
the logic in order to design a efficient system. A system that saves mem-
ory and it is fast. Of course, dealing with PSPACE-complete problems
is not a so easy task. Any information that can guide the designer is of
help. Knowing that the number of copies of a formulas in a proof cab be
a “bottleneck” for saving memory, an obvious solution would be the use
of references instead of copies when representing proofs. The number of
references is exponential, but references to formulas are smaller than for-
mulas in most of the cases. This approach points out to the use of graphs
(digraphs in fact) for representing proofs. There are a lot of developments
done in this direction reported in the literature. Most of them are more se-
mantically than implementation driven. Proof-nets (see [6]) represents an
approach that defends the use of graphs as the most adequate represen-
tation for proofs. We agree with that, but we add a practical motivation
for considering digraphs instead of trees for representing proofs (see [14])
2 The pigeon-hole principle was used to provide a super-polynomial lower bound for
Robinson’s (propositional) Resolution
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